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Abstract
The quantity and sophistication of threats targeting ADSL routers is on a steady increase. There is a reliance on
end-users to ensure that their ADSL router is secure by continually updating the firmware, using strong
authentication credentials, and enabling the in-built firewall. However, to do this, the end-user must be
presented with well written procedural instructions, and an explanation of why this is important. This paper
examines the design quality and security content provided by vendors in ADSL router manuals. This paper
reveals that the lack of security related content and poor overall design could impact on end-users’
interpretation and willingness to implement security controls on their ADSL router.
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INTRODUCTION
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS, 2010) reported that there are over ten million active Internet
connections in Australia as of December, 2010. The ABS figures state that over nine million of these
connections are non-dialup (ABS, 2010). The number of active broadband connections may gradually increase
with the implementation of the Australian Government initiative, the National Broadband Network (NBN). The
NBN will allow all Australian premises to access a high-speed Internet connection, either through fibre optic
cabling, or fixed wireless technologies (DBCDE, 2011). Unfortunately, with the growing number of broadband
services being created, there is a greater incentive for individuals to purposefully compromise Asymmetric
Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) routers. An ADSL router in the context of this paper is an embedded system,
used by computer networks within Small office Home office (SoHo) environments, and may encompass an
Ethernet switch, a wireless access point and an in-built modem. With the appropriate configuration an ADSL
router may provide security to its local clients through an in-built firewall, wireless encryption, access control,
content filtering and network address translation (NAT).
The default firmware of many first generation Netcomm ADSL routers encompassed a web server flaw which
permitted the device to be accessed, compromised and controlled remotely (Sajdak, 2009). In the first quarter of
2009, Psyb0t a new form of malware had been detected worldwide which was specifically targeting MIPS
architecture - Linux based, ADSL routers (Baume, 2009). Psyb0t hijacked consumer grade ADSL routers for the
purposes of creating a botnet (Hunt, 2009). Psyb0t was capable of infecting approximately fifty-five types of
ADSL routers and was pre-populated with approximately six-thousand usernames, and thirteen-thousand
passwords (Magnus & Gassmann, 2009; Sajdak, 2009). This threat may have been mitigated through a firmware
update and by changing the default authentication credentials.
The Chuck Norris Botnet exploited vulnerable ADSL routers which encompassed outdated firmware, coupled
with default and/or weak, username and password combinations (Celeda, Krejci, Vykopal, & Drasar, 2010). In
2011, Trend Micro reported on an ELF_TSUNAMI malware specimen targeting D-Link devices that not only
attempted to control an ADSL router, but also had the capabilities to reset the router’s configuration, allowing
anyone to access and control the device (Mendoza, 2011). The attacks on ADSL routers do not cease to exist
with malware. Television media continues to portray the dangers of using unsecured wireless networks
(Seymour, 2010). The issue of vulnerable wireless networks has been an ongoing issue with many end-users
unaware of the technical aspects of their ADSL router or the need for security (Reznik et al., 2011). In a recent
war-driving study (Mousionis, Vakaloudis, & Hilas, 2011) many wireless networks were found to be open or
using weak, Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) as their main form of security (Mousionis et al., 2011). Attackers
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may need little skill in breaking into wireless networks with authentication credentials and wireless keys easy to
locate throughout the Internet.
Two factors may influence end-users willingness to apply appropriate security to their ADSL router. Firstly, the
end-user must be aware of the risks and the potential outcomes if sufficient security is not applied. Secondly,
end-users must have the appropriate supporting step-by-step literature to guide them through the process.
Television, print and online media continue to promote the ease by which an individual could break into a
wireless network and access or steal data (Seymour, 2010) thus making end-users aware of the risks. To
compliment the awareness of risks, ADSL router manuals should actively promote good security practices to
ensure that such crimes are mitigated. End-users believe that once an ADSL router is functioning properly that it
no longer needs to be reconfigured or modified in the future (Szewczyk, 2006). Hence, there is significant value
in vendors encouraging end-users to securely configure the ADSL router upon its initial setup. There is the
option of venturing on to the vendors website, or accessing security information through media sources such as
YouTube. However, end-users will rarely revisit the configuration options of their ADSL router once the device
is functioning appropriately (Szewczyk, 2006).
Johnson (1995, p.409) explains how computer manuals are generally not written to be understood by novice
end-users. The end-user is often faced with the problem of finding information which is scattered throughout a
complex document. A longitudinal study between 2005 and 2009 discovered that many ADSL router manuals
were of very low quality and did not prioritise or enforce security to the end-user (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009).
This paper evaluates the ADSL router literature supplied by vendors in 2011. This study aims to determine if
improvements have been made, in terms of the design quality of the manual and the enforcement or
recommendations towards security.

METHOD
Manuals should conform to a standard that allows end-users with varying technical competencies to use and
understand the set of procedures. Wieringa, Moore and Barnes (1993, p.3) suggest that a well designed manual
will include; a well written set of procedures, information on the most effective way of completing a task, and
be suitable for both a skilled and novice user. Perelman, Paradis and Barret (1998, p.148) assert that five criteria
should be embedded in all high quality procedural literature. A technical manual should;
1.

Incorporate descriptive page headers, an index page and a table of contents.

2.

Outline the reasons for its creation, the intended audience, and required level of expertise.

3.

Include a detailed glossary to elaborate on uncommon terminology.

4.

Make use of white space to enhance presentation quality.

5.

Use numerous large labelled graphics, clearly depicting each step in the procedure.

The way in which procedures are written by vendors in manuals may also have significant impact on its
interpretation. Studies have shown that in many instances professional documents written by governments and
commercial entities often exceed the literacy levels of the target audience (Mueller, Reid, & Mueller, 2010; Paz,
Liu, Fongwa, Morales, & Hays, 2009). A common method to evaluate the readability of literature is through the
Gunning Fog Index – which measures the required literacy level based on, sentence length and occurrence of
multi-syllable words (Williams-Jones & MacDonald, 2008). The Gunning Fog index is commonly targeted at
health publications however, the Linsear Write readability formula can address such issues as the algorithm has
been specifically designed to calculate the readability of technical manuals (Christensen, 2007). The Linsear
Write formula may be used to assess and alter a text prior to its public release, ensuring that the target audience
may understand the literature.
From an ADSL router perspective the security features that a novice end-user could utilise effectively are quite
limited. However, there are still sufficient mechanisms available to reduce the risk of the device being
compromised. As a result, an ADSL router manual should recommend that the default password (and username
if possible) be changed, whilst making suggestions for good password creation. The manual should in-turn detail
the security benefits of checking and updating the firmware on a regular basis as this would mitigate many
firmware specific issues that current malware is exploiting. The in-built firewall if turned on may reduce many
network threats. The manual should recommend that Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) is used rather than Wired
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Equivalent Privacy (WEP) or an open network to prevent unauthorised access. Media Access Control addresses
filtering and disabling of SSID broadcasting can limit the exposure and vulnerability of the wireless network to
outside intruders. Additional devices such as a wireless printer are beyond the scope of this paper and are not
considered in the overall security state of the ADSL router.
Each manual was evaluated according to three separate criterions. Firstly, an analysis was made to determine
how closely it follows or conforms to the five guiding criteria for procedural technical manuals. Secondly, the
Linsear Write formula was applied to the Introduction of each manual to determine the literacy level required to
understand the opening comments by the vendor using the free online Readability Formula (Byline Media,
2011). Lastly, the manual was evaluated according to the quality of the security recommendations made by the
vendor.
A simple survey approach was utilised to identify which devices the large and small retail outlets in Western
Australia were currently selling. The devices selected were those offered by retail outlets across Western
Australia, and provided by Internet Service Providers’ when a consumer adopts a new broadband service. The
ADSL routers selected and the subsequent manuals included;
6.

Billion 7800N (Billion, 2010)

7.

Netgear DGN 1000 (Netgear, 2011)

8.

D-Link DSL-2740B (D-Link, 2011)

9.

Netcomm NB6 (Netcomm, 2010)

10. TP-Link TD-W8151N (TP-Link, 2011)
11. Belkin F7D1401 (Belkin, 2011)

EVALUATION OF MANUALS
A notable characteristic amongst the manuals was the required literacy skills. Using the introductory or
overview page as a basis the content was analysed with the results shown in Table 1. The Linsear Write scores,
with the exception of two manuals sit within the value of fourteen. This signifies a score which requires a level
of literacy far beyond that of a high school education, generally targeting those with a tertiary education. Belkin
wrote its information in a very basic format, allowing end-users to be presented with the relevant information
without needing to read paragraphs of complicated text.
Table 1 Linsear Write Manual Readability Scores
Vendor Manual
Billion 7800N
Netgear DGN 1000
D-Link DSL-2740B
Netcomm NB6
TP-Link TD-W8151N
Belkin F7D1401

Linsear Write Readability Score
14.2
15.3
13.5
14.6
9.4
4.7

Overall the quality of the product manuals examined was far from impressive as demonstrated in Table 2. In the
previous study, (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009) Netgear presented a manual of much higher quality compared to its
competitors. This trend continued amongst the manuals examined in this study. Netgear still continued to
include vital elements to make the procedural manual simple and effective to use by novice end-users.
All of the product manuals included a contents page which clearly reflected the content of the entire document.
However, for a novice user, the clarity could have been improved by using less technical (computer jargon)
words. A glossary of terms could be considered essential in computing due to the high number of technical
words and acronyms. However, many of the manuals did not include any glossary. Specifically, many of the
manuals discuss and use complicated words with the presumptions that the end-user would already be familiar
with the concepts. Netcomm provided an online means by which an end-user could locate the meaning of
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computer based terminology. However, this provides little help for an individual who cannot access the Internet
as a result of not understanding complicated technical words.
An index page was only provided by Netgear and Netcomm. This is unfortunate seeing as an index page is as an
easy and time efficient approach to finding relevant information on a given topic. The lack of an index page
coupled with a confusing table of contents may result in an end-user needing to read the entire manual in order
to locate a desirable topic. This unfortunately contradicts rationale human behaviour. Schriver (1997) identified
that very few individuals would ever read a procedural product manual from beginning to end. As a result, endusers could reasonably be expected to overlook critical security elements for use with the ADSL router.
Table 2 Comparison and Contrast of Product Literature Design
Descriptive Page Headers
Contents Page
Index Page
Detailed Glossary
Professional Layout
Large and Clear Graphics
Description of Graphics
Explanation of Intended Audience

Billion

D


D
D



Netgear
D
D
D

D

D


D-Link
D
D


D
D



Netcomm

D
D
D



D

TP-Link

D


D
D



Belkin
D
D


D
D



In the previous study, there was a small improvement by vendors in encouraging end-users to implement good
security practices as the years progressed (Szewczyk & Valli, 2009). Unfortunately, it appears that vendors have
gone backwards in encouraging the use of security as shown in Table 2. Belkin in particular did not encourage
end-users to implement any specific security and appeared to present it as a deterrent. This may have been due
to the very small manual size of thirty pages. Billion and TP-Link had manual sizes near one-hundred pages yet
still failed to encourage end-users to implement sufficient security. Unfortunately some of the vendors further
discouraged end-users from securing their product. As demonstrated through the quote below, TP-Link only
recommended that the firmware be updated if the end-user is experiencing difficulties. It could be difficult to
determine if an ADSL router is misbehaving due to the sophistication of current malware.
“If the router is not experiencing difficulties, there is no need to download a more recent firmware version,
unless the version has a new feature that you want to use.”
D-Link does make an attempt to encourage that end-users implement security, especially from a wireless
perspective. Unfortunately, nowhere in the product manual does it explicitly give recommendations or advice in
terms of what would be most beneficial. Billion did provide a detailed outline of every possible security control
that an end-user could implement.
Overall Netgear, was most influential in providing security recommendations. For instance, when choosing a
password, Netgear clearly states that dictionary words from any language should be omitted, and that numbers,
symbols, uppercase, and lowercase characters should be used. Netgear further depicted the dangers with endusers utilising wireless networks and provided a clear contrast of the merits and disadvantages of using a
wireless network. To further mitigate the issue of end-users failing to update their firmware, Netgear has
incorporated and explained the automatic update checker on the device. In this instance, a clear explanation has
been provided detailing the security risks of not updating the firmware coupled with encouraging messages
stating that the latest firmware should always be applied when it becomes available.
Table 3 Comparison of Security Recommendations in ADSL Router Manuals
Changing default password
Password choice
Checking/updating firmware
Outlines risks of wireless
WPA or WPA2
Use of in-built firewall
MAC address filtering
Disable SSID broadcasting

Billion









Netgear
D
D
D
D
D

D
D

D-Link
D



D




Netcomm



D

D

D

TP-Link







D

Belkin
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A study of 312 participants (Herath & Rao, 2009) showed that end-users must be appropriately encouraged or
forced to use a high level information security measures. One of the prevalent outcomes of this study was the
choice of words used to encourage the use of security on the vendors’ product. There is a distinct difference
between a vendor stating that a security setting exists and recommending or encouraging that it be used.
Unfortunately, many of the vendor manuals analysed in this study, only state that a particular setting or feature
is available on the ADSL router. Netcomm outlined the potential issues which could emerge if the firmware on
the product is updated, such as the product may no longer function correctly. This may significantly deter endusers from applying any update. However, at no point did the Netcomm manual outline the advantages such as
enhanced stability or security. From the end-users perspective it would appear that the disadvantages
significantly outweigh the advantages of updating the firmware.

CONCLUSION
The ongoing releases of ADSL router literature may create many problems for the end-user. From a
psychological perspective the end-user could be driven away from the information in the product manuals
particularly where it is difficult to interpret what the vendor is articulating. As ADSL routers tend to encompass
little or no security by default, vendors should make product literature useable and attractive to ensure that
security is implemented. The design quality and content presented in many of the manuals is far from adequate.
In the first instance when this study was undertaken the manuals were poorly delimitated but the issue of
insecure ADSL routers was not a significant issue. The number of attacks specifically targeting ADSL routers is
on a significant increase. There are simple measures that end-user can take to alleviate themselves from the
dangers. Future research will continue to examine ADSL router manuals in the effort to determine if vendors
eventually improve their product literature. There is also an avenue of research in examining what end-users
learn or take away from using the product literature to setup and secure a networking device.
There are simple solutions to mitigate many of the issues that are present in the manuals. The essential
introduction of a glossary and index page in every manual will reduce the burden of end-users locating desirable
information. Vendors must also stop assuming prior knowledge. Vendors have the luxury in that they can easily
educate end-users of the dangers and risk of using the Internet, whilst at the same time providing detailed
solutions for mitigating many threats through the product manuals. Lastly, vendors must make significant
recommendations as to which security feature should be enabled on the device. With countless security features
available, end-users may often choose the weaker or obsolete measure. Vendors should recommend a superior
countermeasure through the manual to alleviate many of the pressures already faced by novice computer users.
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